This paper empirically investigates whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior as a result of financial deregulation in the 1980s, and whether any observed herd behavior brought about inefficiencies that could have caused macroeconomic fluctuations. Using loan-portfolio data, the paper examines Granger-causalities in lending behavior by different types of banks. We find that Japanese banks inefficiently herd from the early through mid-1980s, the period immediately after financial deregulation began. However, contrary to anecdotal evidence, inefficient herd behavior is rarely observed in the 1990s. The herd behavior in the 1980s was more frequently observed in lending to new borrowers than to traditional borrowers. In addition, other banks were inclined to follow those banks that were considered more informed in lending to a specific industry, or that were large enough to adjust more effectively to the environment created by deregulation. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature and suggest the possibility that the herd behavior contributed to the asset price bubble in the late 1980s.
Introduction
It is often argued that Japanese banks have engaged in herd behavior (yokonarabi in Japanese). Until the late 1970s, the Japanese financial system was strictly regulated.
Capital markets were prevented to grow, and bank loans and bonds underwritten by banks were the primary external financing source for Japanese firms. Above all, banks were regulated explicitly and implicitly. Loan amounts, interest rates, borrowers, branching, fees, and other business lines were controlled, and banks' competition was discouraged to prevent none to go bankrupt. Thus, banks were often forced to behave uniformly to keep the relative sizes of banks stable. As the Japanese economy grew, the herd behavior was criticized as a symbol of the inefficiency of the Japanese financial market. 1 Since a series of financial deregulation measures began in the 1980s, herd behavior seems to have disappeared. Banks were gradually allowed to decide their strategies by themselves. In addition, capital markets for major Japanese firms developed in the wake of the huge issuance of government bonds from the late 1970s. Deregulation thus seems to have made Japanese financial markets in general, and the lending market in particular, more efficient. 2 But, it is plausible that Japanese banks were inclined to herd even after deregulation, because deregulation itself created structural shifts in both the demand and supply sides of the lending market. As to the demand side, borrowers that had long-term relationships with banks ceased to rely only on banks when raising funds in the 1980s. This is known as the financial disintermediation. As a result, banks had to find new borrowers, such as firms in real estate and finance industries, that they were unfamiliar with (Hoshi and Kashyap [23] ). Lacking information about their new borrowers, banks might have herded by inferring the quality of borrowers from each other's behavior. As for the supply side, until deregulation, the areas in which a Japanese bank could lend were legally segmented by type of bank, and each type had comparative advantages in its own areas.
As deregulation progressed, banks' borrower bases gradually overlapped (Packer[35] ). As each type of bank explored new borrowers in other banks' areas, they might have blindly followed other types of banks that had already had advantages in the areas.
There is also a good deal anecdotal evidence of herd behavior in the lending market The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (NIKKEI), Japan's leading economic newspaper, frequently wrote about herd behavior by Japanese banks during the stagnation in the 1990s. There was a peak of 146 articles in 1992 when it was clear that the asset bubble had burst and the financial system faced serious consequences, while the 1980s had an average of around 20 articles a year.
However, few studies have empirically examined herd behavior by Japanese banks. In addition, the literature has little investigated whether their behavior, if any, had macroeconomic impacts on the economy. The purpose of this paper is to rectify this situation in two ways. First, we empirically investigate whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior since the period of financial deregulation. We focus on behavior across types of banks. This is important because different types of banks are likely to possess different information about borrowers, which may cause herding by less-informed banks drawing inferences from the behavior of banks considered better-informed. Our empirical methodology is based on Jain and Gupta [29] , which examine Granger-causalities between lending decisions by different types of banks as evidence for herding.
Second, we examine whether any herd behavior identified brought about any inefficient markets equilibrium that was inconsistent with fundamental economic conditions and could cause macroeconomic fluctuations. We test whether observed causalities can be explained by economic variables, such as the future profitability of borrowers or structural changes in the Japanese financial market, that may uniformly affect the lending decisions of most banks. If any causality is observed even after controlling for those factors, it may be considered as evidence for inefficient herd behavior. 3 In an environment of imperfect information, herd behavior can cause an inefficient outcome. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [6] [7] establish an informational cascade model, in which under imperfect information, rational agents infer fundamental conditions based not only on their own private information, but also on the past record of decisions made by their predecessors. If agents learn others that did not have enough information of fundamental conditions, the equilibrium can be inefficient. 4 However, herd behavior does not always bring about an inefficiency. If banks respond to the same fundamental conditions independently and rationally, they look following herd behavior, known as clustering or spurious herding (Hirshleifer and Teoh [21] ). But the equilibrium is socially efficient. Therefore, if we refer to the macroeconomic impact of herd behavior, it is necessary to examine whether bank herding brought about any inefficiencies. 5 Our empirical results are supportive of the prediction that Japanese banks followed herd behavior after financial deregulation. The results exhibit a time-specific feature of herding. That is, banks followed inefficient herd behavior in the early through mid-1980s, which is immediately after the start of deregulation. In that period, the observed herding was borrower-specific in the sense that the inefficient herding was more frequently observed in lending to new borrowers than in lending to traditional borrowers. We also find a bank-specific feature in bank herding. That is, in the face of the uncertainty, banks were inclined to follow the lead of banks that were considered more informed in lending to a specific industry, or that were larger enough to adjust themselves more effectively to the new environment created by deregulation.
On balance our results suggest that deregulation created an uncertain environment that had induced banks to inefficiently follow herd behavior by inferring from other banks creditworthiness of new borrowers. This might have contributed to the asset bubble in the late 1980s. Such behavior is rarely observed in other periods, in particular in the 1990s. and real economy, see Bischi, Gallegati, Gardini, Leombruni, and Palestrini [5] , and Welch [41] . 4 There are a number of theoretical studies of the various types of rational herding. Information cascade is also analyzed by Alevy, Haigh, and List [1] , Banerjee [3] , and Chari and Kehoe [10] . Other studies include herding based on pay-off externalities: bank run in Diamond and Dybvig [15] , liquidity in Devenow and Welch [14] , and receipt of correlated private information in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein [18] and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman [20] . Herding stemming from reputation concerns related to acting differently from other managers is studied by Scharfstein and Stein [37] . Herding due to a comparative advantage in holding securities with certain characteristics is studied by Falkenstein [17] . For surveys of herd behavior, see Bikhchandani and Sharma [8] , Chamley [11] , Devenow and Welch [14] , Hirshleifer and Teoh [21] , and Welch [41] . 5 As an example, in the asset price bubble of the late 1980s, most banks expected the surging land prices to be sustained, so expanded lending to real estate-related industries (Ueda [39] ).
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Our empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions of studies based on Bayesian learning frameworks. The time-specific feature of observed herding is consistent with predictions that agents learn investment strategies from the behavior of other agents when there was a significantly new environment, and cease to do so as they become familiar with the environment. 6 The borrower-and bank-specific features are consistent with the literature that shows that agents are inclined to follow informed agents when they make investments into unfamiliar borrowers. 7 This paper is closely related to a few empirical studies about herd behavior by US banks. Jain and Gupta [29] find that small US banks blindly replicated the lending behavior of large US banks in lending to developing countries from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, when lending opportunities in the United States decreased due to economic recession and they had to find new borrowers in other markets. The situation is quite similar to what occurred in Japan in the 1980s. Barron and Valev[4] also find that smaller US banks also relied on the behavior by more-informed banks from 1982 to 1994. Our contribution compared with these papers is that, while they only examine the existence of herd behavior, we also examine whether the observed behavior created any inefficiency in the lending market.
Uchida and Nakagawa [40] investigate herd behavior by Japanese banks, focusing on behavior within groups of banks of the same type, in contrast to our analysis focusing on herding across types of banks. The results of these two papers are complementary.
Our results indicate that inefficient herd behavior occurred across bank types in the early through mid-1980s, while Uchida and Nakagawa find herding among the same types of banks during the late 1980s. This successive herding (of different forms) might have contributed to the formation of the asset price bubble in the late 1980s. 8 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the Japanese bank lending market and its historical transition. Section 3 conducts basic Granger-causality tests to examine the existence of herd behavior. Section 4 examines the efficiency of the herd behavior observed in Section 3. Section 5 proceeds with further detailed analysis, sequential causality tests, to further analyze the existence and efficiency of herd behavior. Section 6 checks the robustness of the previous results by conducting panel VAR causality tests. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Loan Data
This section explains different types of Japanese banks and introduces the data on their loans outstanding by borrower. This section also describes the historical transition of borrowers for banks to provide background for later empirical analysis. Details on data are in the data appendix.
Bank type
We focus on four types of Japanese banks: city banks, regional banks, long-term credit banks (hereafter LTC banks), and trust banks. City banks are the largest banks in Japan. They have branch offices in major cities and operate nationwide, as well as internationally. Regional banks are smaller and operate in local markets. 9 LTC had the special aim of long-term finance, while trust banks focused on trust services. Both are often characterized as having been the main providers of long-term funds in postwar Japan until the 1990s.
Our analysis focuses on the interaction between city banks and the other three types.
Although there was segregation of business areas in the financial industry, the scope of business areas of city banks has been very broad and likely to overlap with the other types of banks. It is also reasonable to focus on city banks, as they have been dominant in the Japanese lending market. Table 1 shows that, for decades, city banks loans outstanding have accounted for more than 40 % of total loans outstanding in Japan. Compared to the 1980s, the 1990s shows stability in the loan shares. That is, little change is observed after the implosion of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s. In this sense, the structural and strategic consequences of the 1980s deregulation largely played out during the 1980s -although deregulation continued during the 1990s. Together with the fact that the 1990s is a period of stagnation and banking crises, we expect the behavior of Japanese banks in the 1990s to be different from the 1980s.
Type of borrowers
Based on these observations, we examine the lending behavior of Japanese banks to traditional industries and to emerging industries. The discussion thus far implies a borrower-specific feature of herding. That is, herding is likely to be found in loans to emerging industries in the 1980s, because banks needed new customers if they were to 10 The deregulation includes such institutional reforms as the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Act (December 1980) and enforcement of the New Banking Act (April 1982). The Japan-US Yen Dollar Committee report (June 1984) was also a factor. See Hoshi and Kashyap [23] [24, ch 7], Ramseyer [36] and Campbell and Hamao [13] for more details.
grow, but might not obtain enough information about these borrowers. In contrast, it is less likely to find herding in loans to traditional industries, because the banks knew these customers, and they became relatively less important borrowers. We do not analyze the status quo industries, because the loan shares to these industries were marginal and stabile.
Existence of Herd Behavior
In this section, we empirically examine whether herd behavior existed or not between city banks and the other types of banks in the Japanese lending market.
Methodology
Our empirical methodology is to estimate two-variate vector autoregressive (VAR) models of the loan data of city banks and of the other types of banks. We examine whether Granger-causalities are observed between those loan variables.
We focus on four sample periods based on the historical background explained in As a loan variable that represents the lending behavior by each type of banks to each industry group, we use the ratio of that type of banks' loans outstanding to the industry group to those banks' total loans outstanding. The size of loans outstanding is thus normalized so that we can examine whether banks adjusted their portfolio composition by herding. 12 Our VAR includes a constant term, seasonal dummies, and a dummy variable for the change in the definition of the data in the second quarter of 1993. 11 We do not analyze the early 1970s, because of data availability. It is also appropriate to focus on the periods after window guidance by the Bank of Japan became less important. Until 1981, every quarter the Bank set a plan of total loans outstanding from domestic banks, and the increase in loans was controlled as planned. In 1982, guidance was reformed to take the form of a voluntary submission of planned lending by individual banks, and was lifted completely in July 1991. 12 We do not investigate the level of loans outstanding. Those data tend to correlate among different banks, and thus to generate spurious causalities more than the ratio data do, because the level data seem to be more subject to macroeconomic trends. There is a series on New Loans for Equipment Funds by Industry, which seems to be less subject to macroeconomic trends. However, the data are not categorized by bank type. Table 2 shows the results regarding causalities between loan ratios of city banks and those of the other types of banks. We find three features of observed herding. 13 First, we find a time-specific feature of the results in the sense that the number of significant causalities increases from 1975-84 to 1980-89 and then decreases from 1985-94 to 1990-99. This suggests that Japanese banks followed herd behavior most extensively in the 1980s when deregulation started, and by the 1990s that they gradually ceased to herd.
Results
As is explained in Section 2.2, the financial disintermediation forced most banks to switch borrowers from traditional to new industries in the 1980s. There is a possibility that banks followed each other's lending behavior in order to explore new (unfamiliar) borrowers. As banks became accustomed to the new borrowers by the 1990s, herd behavior seems to have disappeared. On the other hand, this finding does not support the anecdotal argument that Japanese banks followed herd behavior during the long stagnation of the 1990s.
Second, in contrast to our prediction, we do not clearly find a borrower-specific feature of herding. Causalities are observed not only in loans to emerging industries, but also in loans to traditional industries. This suggests financial deregulation might have induced herding in both industry groups to a similar extent. Alternatively, herding in traditional industries might have reflected the legacy of regulation measures until the late 1970s.
Third, we find, as a bank-specific feature of the results, that causalities are observed mostly from LTC and trust banks to city banks in 1980-89 and 1985-94, and from city banks to regional banks in 1980-89. The former finding suggests that city banks followed LTC and trust banks, possibly because those banks had a comparative advantage in longterm lending that was established during the rapid-growth era in the late 1970s. This phenomenon may be called the Cowbell effect, because of its similarity to a relationship among Japanese banks noted by Higano [19] . 14 The latter finding implies that, in the 1980s, smaller (regional) banks followed bigger (city) banks deemed likely to have a greater potential to adjust to the new financial environment.
In summary, Table 2 suggests that financial deregulation created a new environment 13 There are several significant negative estimates of coefficients that are considered to imply that the banks compete with each other and their loans are mutually substitutes. This might be an interesting topic, but we deter its investigation to a future work. 14 Higano points out that there might have been an inducement effect in loans made by the Japan Development Bank (JDB, presently the Development Bank of Japan, a government financial institution. He claimed that loans made by JDB signaled that the government was happy with the loans, and that the loans "thus were implicitly guaranteed by the government. Packer [35] argues that the LTC banks played a similar role to JDB's providing long-term funds to borrowers who were important in Japan's postwar development.
that stimulated herd behavior among Japanese banks in the 1980s. In that period, deregulation seemed to have induced bank herding in lending to both traditional and emerging industries, although herding in the traditional industries may also reflect regulation measures until the late 1970s. In addition, banks might have followed those types of banks that seemed to have comparative advantages in lending to a specific industry, or that have an ability to adjust themselves to the new environment. On the other hand, that evidence is rarely observed in the 1990s.
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that agents tend to learn from the behavior of other informed agents in the existence of information imperfection.
Inefficient Herd Behavior
Next we proceed to test whether the observed causalities reflect inefficient herd behavior.
As mentioned in Introduction, banks should take account of the fundamental conditions of the economy when making lending decisions. This can induce efficient herding that is consistent with the fundamental economy. If evidence for herding is found even after controlling for those fundamental factors, it suggests that Japanese banks might have followed inefficient herd behavior.
Methodology
The test is conducted by introducing into a VAR several macroeconomic variables.
First, the ratio of nominal GDP by industry group to aggregate nominal GDP and the ratio of the stock price index by industry group to the TOPIX (a broad market stock index) are used to control for changes in the relative size of loans demand by each industry group.
Next, deregulation beginning in the 1980s accelerated disintermediation by traditional industries. Then the ratio of total private bonds outstanding to aggregate nominal GDP is used to control for the structural shift in loans demand by traditional industries.
In addition, the surge in land prices in the 1980s seems to have stimulated loans demand by emerging industries because land could be used as collateral, especially in lending to unfamiliar borrowers. Then the ratio of a nationwide land price index to aggregate nominal GDP is used to control for changes in loans demand by emerging industries.
One and two lags of these control variables are introduced, not only to effectively 9 control for efficient herding, but also to mitigate the endogenous bias problem. 15 We ensure sufficient degrees of freedom in the causality test by limiting the number and the lag of control variables. Also, we do not introduce a variable that equally affects loan supply or demand of all borrowers, because such a variable is less likely to affect a bank's portfolio composition. For example, the level of aggregate GDP, TOPIX, or call rates do not change the loan ratio of a specific borrower. When those variables were introduced, they were mostly insignificant in VAR estimations. Further, the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 1990s might have had unequal effects among the loans demand of different borrowers. However, we do not introduce it because its data are not consistently available for our sample period. 16 Table 3 shows the results regarding inefficient herd behavior between city banks and the other types of banks. Similarly to Table 2 , we can observe several significant causalities after deregulation. However, most of them become less significant.
Results
First, we observe a slight time-specific herding in that causalities are observed most frequently in 1980-89, but this is less remarkable than in Table 2 . Hence, after the 1980s, we cannot speculate that herd behavior generated crucial inefficiency in the lending market in any specific period. Second, we do not clearly find the borrower-specific feature since the 1980s. Significant causalities are sparse in both industry groups, except for 1975-84.
Third, the bank-specific feature is also obscure, so that the Cowbell effect becomes less significant, although causalities from city to regional banks are observed in 1980-89.
In summary, Table 3 does not indicate any significant evidence for inefficient herd behavior by Japanese banks since financial deregulation in the 1980s. This is because most of the causalities observed in Table 2 become less significant in Table 3 . At this point, we can conclude that there might have been bank herd behavior after deregulation, but the behavior might not have caused inefficiency in the lending market.
The previous section looked at four sample periods to examine herd behavior by Japanese banks. Sufficient evidence of inefficient herd behavior was not confirmed. A possible reason is that bank lending behavior had been gradually changing over time, so that herd behavior can not be identified just by testing a few specific sample periods. We therefore investigate whether inefficient herd behavior can be found in other sample periods.
For this purpose, we conduct sequential causality tests, which examine Grangercausalities between Japanese banks for all possible ten-year sample periods. Specifically, we select the earliest ten-year sample period from the whole sample period and examine causalities as in the previous sections. This is repeated sequentially, shifting the sample period by one quarter, until the end of the selected sample period reaches the end of the whole period. The advantage of this test is that we can observe the transition of the causalities more stringently. The figure shows several features of herding similar to those observed in Table 2 . As the time-specific feature, causalities appear most persistently in the 1980s, immediately after deregulation began, and almost disappear by the 1990s. 17 Borrower-specific herding is not distinctly found among observed causalities in loans to either industry group.
Existence of Herd Behavior
Interestingly, the bank-specific feature is found more clearly in the 1980s in both industry groups: the Cowbell effects and regional bank herding toward city banks, implying that banks are inclined to follow more-informed banks.
In terms of the existence of herd behavior, therefore, we confirm more clearly the features as those in Section 3.2. We can thus conclude that financial deregulation might have stimulated herd behavior across different types of Japanese banks in the 1980s, while our results seldom support the anecdotal argument that Japanese banks herded in the 1990s.
Inefficient Herd Behavior
We turn to the analysis of the efficiency of the observed herd behavior. Figure 3 shows several causalities that may more clearly reflect the influence of deregulation.
First, causalities concentrate in the early through mid-1980s, and mostly disappear in the late 1980s. Second, although the borrower-specific feature is not found in Figure 2, in Figure 3 we find that causalities are more intensive in loans to emerging industries after deregulation. On the other hand, most of the causalities in traditional industries are eliminated by control variables. Third, bank-specific causalities are observed more specifically than in Figure 2 : from LTC and trust banks to city banks in the early 1980s, and from city to regional banks in the mid-1980s.
Our results generally support our prediction that Japanese banks inefficiently followed herd behavior immediately after the beginning of financial deregulation. In that period inefficient herding is observed, particularly in lending to emerging industries, possibly because of the lack of information about those new borrowers. The inefficient behavior in the early 1980s took the form of city banks following more-informed LTC and trust banks, and in the mid-1980s, less-informed regional banks following city banks. 18 Therefore, considering the rapid growth of loans to emerging industries in the 1980s, herd behavior caused by deregulation might have contributed to subsequent economic fluctuations through emerging loans by less-informed banks. This finding is similar to the results of empirical studies about herd behavior by US banks. Jain and Gupta [29] and Barron and Valev[4] find that small US banks relied on the lending behavior of moreinformed US banks in lending to unfamiliar developing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
On the other hand, banks might have behaved efficiently in the 1990s, except for LTC banks following city banks in lending to emerging industries.
Robustness Check: Panel VAR Causality Test
In this section, we check the robustness of our results using another technique. In previous sections, we focused on ten-year sample periods in order to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom. However, the sample period might be so long that includes structural changes in the economy. We thus check causalities under a shorter sample period by estimating panel vector autoregression models (panel VAR).
Methodology
Panel VAR estimation is to estimate a VAR with panel data. Here, in order to test causalities between loan ratios of two bank types in an industry group, the panel VAR fixed-effect model is expressed as:
x i,t is the loan ratio of bank type x to industry i in period t, and y i,t is the loan ratio of bank type y to the same in dustry in the same period. u i,t and v i,t are i.i.d. error terms. Panel VAR estimation is different from standard VAR in that the number of total observations of the industry group is increased from T to N × T . For example, in the standard causality test for the traditional industries during 1980:1 -1989:4, the number of observations of the loan ratio is 40 (T = 4× 10), because the loan ratio is calculated using the sum of loans outstanding to manufacturing and wholesale industries. In the panel VAR causality test for the same data, the number of observations is 80 (N × T = 2 × 40), because the loan ratio is calculated using individually the loans outstanding to those industries. As a result, we can ensure sufficient degrees of freedom in the test even if we examine a short period.
We focus on the following five-year periods: 1975: 1 -1979:4, 1980:1 -1984:4, 1985:1 -1989:4, 1990:1 -1994:4, and 1995:1 -1999:4 . We estimate a panel VAR using generalized least square (GLS), considering the heteroscedasticity of the loan ratio by industry. In addition, loan ratios are normalized by dividing them with their own sample means. Other details of the panel VAR causality test are the same as previous tests. 19 19 The optimal lag of the panel VAR is determined based on SBIC. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen [22] emphasize the importance of the selection of the optimal lag in the panel VAR estimation. SBIC has 13 Table 4 shows the results of panel causality tests for the existence of herd behavior. The table shows that causalities are found most frequently in 1980-84 and 1985-89. This implies that financial deregulation stimulated herd behavior by Japanese banks in the 1980s. A few causalities are also found in the 1990s, although they are not prevalent among Japanese banks.
Existence of Herd Behavior
Again, we do not clearly find the borrower-specific feature. That is, herding was no more intensive in lending to emerging industries. As for the banks-specific feature, we can confirm that regional banks often followed city banks. On the other hand, city, LTC, and trust banks seem to have followed each other. Those banks might have been interdependent in shorter periods.
In summary, the panel causality tests reinforce the previous results that Japanese banks followed herd behavior in facing deregulation in the 1980s. But features regarding borrowers or bank types are not clearly obtained to the extent that is consistent with the results in previous sections.
Inefficient Herd Behavior
We now proceed to panel VAR causality tests for the efficiency of the observed herd behavior. The variables to control for efficiency are the same as the macroeconomic variables used earlier. Note, however, that in the panel causality test, a different control variable is chosen for each industry of an industry group, while in the standard causality test a control variable is applied for each industry group. In this sense, the efficiency of herd behavior can be controlled more effectively in this panel test. Table 5 shows the results for inefficient herd behavior. We find the time-specific feature that causalities are most frequently observed in the early 1980s. The borrowerspecific feature is not clearly observed in the 1980s, because causalities are found in the traditional industries as well as in the emerging industries. Again, causalities in the traditional industries might reflect not only the effect of deregulation, but also effects of past regulation measures.
Finally, the results in the 1980s suggest the bank-specific feature. The Cowbell effect is often found from LTC and trust banks to city banks, although reverse causalities are partly found. In contrast to the previous analysis, causalities from city banks to regional bank are not clearly observed in the 1980s. However, if we examine the mid-1980s (1983:1 been commonly used to determine the optimal lag, according to Larsson, Lyhagen, and Lothgren [31] and Ericsson and Irandoust [16] .
in both industry groups (Panel (f) of Table 5 ).
In summary, the main results are consistent with the results from sequential causality testing, in that Japanese banks, the less-informed in particular, displayed inefficient herd behavior in the early 1980s, the beginning period of deregulation. 20 
Conclusion
This paper has examined empirically whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior after financial deregulation started in the early 1980s, and whether observed herding had brought about inefficient outcomes that could have led to subsequent macroeconomic fluctuations.
The perceived herd behavior of Japanese banks is considered a symbol of inefficient Japanese financial markets. Even though the behavior seems to have disappeared because of deregulation, there has been much anecdotal evidence for herd behavior by banks, which has been blamed for economic problems in the 1990s.
Our empirical results suggest that Japanese banks inefficiently herded in the early through mid-1980s, immediately after the beginning of deregulation. In that period, the inefficient behavior seems to have been more significant in lending to new borrowers that banks had not been familiar with than in lending to traditional borrowers. In addition, banks seem to have followed those banks more informed in lending to a specific industry.
These results are consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature, and suggest the possibility that inefficient herding might have had contributed to formation of the asset price bubble in the late 1980s. On the other hand, the results do not support anecdotal evidence that Japanese banks followed inefficient herd behavior in the 1990s.
There are two important issues that are unchallenged in this paper. First, we do not empirically investigate whether and how inefficient herding contributed to formation of the asset price bubble in the late 1980s and the accumulation of non-performing loans in the 1990s. Second, we focus sorely on the question of whether observed herd behavior was efficient, not on identifying any theoretical causes of observed herding. Those issues are to be clarified in a separate study.
A Data Appendix
All the data used in this paper are available from Nikkei NEEDS Macroeconomic Data File. The original sources are shown below. The types of banks and their loans outstanding are defined as follows. First, regional and second-tier regional banks are combined as regional banks. Second, the loans out- 
Loans Outstanding

Other Data
Bond data are available from the Annual Report of the Japan Securities Dealers Association. The data include Total Private Bonds Outstanding, which is used to establish the proxy for disintermediation.
Land price data are available from the Japan Real Estate Institute. The data includes the Nationwide Urban Land Price Index, which is used to establish the proxy for the collateral value of loans to emerging industries.
Each of the above control variables is used not only for an industry group in simple and sequential causality tests, but also for every industry of an industry group in the panel VAR causality tests. Note: This table shows the results regarding causalities between loan ratios of city banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups. The rows of each panel show the types of banks whose relationships with city banks are being investigated. Two columns show the industry groups as borrowers. " Lag " represents the optimal lag of a VAR, which is determined based on SBIC. " => City " represents a causality from the relevant type of banks to city banks. " City => " is the reverse causality. Each value is an estimated sum of the coefficients of the loan ratio of the type of banks that is an explanatory variable in the VAR. The superscript *** means that the sum of coefficients is positive and significant at 1% level in an F-test; ** at 5%; * at 10%. Results regarding trust banks for 1975-84 are not available because of a lack of data. Note: This table shows the results of panel VAR causality tests between loan ratios of city banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups, with one and two lagged macroeconomic variables. Loan ratios and macro variables are normaliezed by dividing them with their own sample means. Other detail is seen in Table 4 .
Traditional Emerging
Traditional Emerging Note: This figure shows the results regarding sequential causality tests between loan ratios of city banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups, without macroeconomic variables. The rows are the types of banks (except for city banks). The columns are the industry groups as borrowers. In each panel, " => City " represents a causality from the relevant type of banks to city banks. " City => " is the reverse causality. The horizontal axis is the median of each sumple period (e.g., the results at "1982:1'' represent the results of the sample period "1977:1 --1986:4''). The data from 1970:1 to 1999:4 are used to obtain results for 1975:1 ("1970:1 --1979:4'') through 1995:1 ("1990:1 --1999:4''). The solid line is an estimated sum of the coefficients of the loan ratio of the type of banks that is an explanatory variable in the VAR. The dark and light shadows represent that the sum of the coefficients is significant at 1% and 5% level in an F-test, respectively. The optimal lag of a VAR is determined based on SBIC. Note that results of trust banks are not obtained by 1981:4 because of lack of the data.
City <= Figure 3 Sequential Causality Tests regarding Inefficient Herd Behavior
Regional LTC Trust
Note: This figure shows the results of sequential causality tests between loan ratios of city banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups, with one and two lagged macro variables. The black line is an estimated sum of the coefficients of the loan ratio of the type of banks that is an explanatory variable in the VAR.
Other detail is seen in Figure 2 . 
